McLean's notion of Selective Interleaving Functions (SIFs) is perhaps the bestknown attempt to construct a framework for expressing various security properties. We examine the expressive power of SIFs carefully. We show that SIFs cannot capture nondeducibility on strategies (NOS). We also prove that the set of security properties expressed with SIFs is not closed under conjunction, from which it follows that separability is strictly stronger than double generalized noninterference. However, we show that if we generalize the notion of SIF in a natural way, then NOS is expressible, and the set of security properties expressible by generalized SIFs is closed under conjunction.
Introduction
Trying to formalize what it means for a system to be secure is a far from trivial task. Many definitions of security have been proposed, using quite different formalisms. One intuition that many of these definitions have tried to capture is that a system is secure if no information flows from a higher-level user to a lower-level user [Goguen and Meseguer 1982] . (From here on in, we just call these users high and low, respectively.) This intuition, in turn, is captured by saying that, given their local observations, low users cannot rule out any possible behavior of high users. But even this intuition can be formalized in a number of ways, depending on what we understand by "high behavior" and on what kind of information we specifically want to protect.
Many current approaches to defining security (for example, [McLean 1990; McLean 1994; Wittbold and Johnson 1990; McCullough 1987] ) assume that high and low users send input values to the system, which responds with output values. The "system" is then modeled as a set of sequences (traces) of low/high input and output values. Various definitions of security then impose conditions on the set of possible traces.
The following are some of the best-known definitions from the literature:
• Separability (abbreviated SEP) [McLean 1994 ] is one of the most restrictive definitions. It requires that the system can be viewed as being composed of two independent subsystems, corresponding to the low and high users: every possible trace generated by the low user is compatible with every trace produced by the high user. While a separable system is certainly secure under any reasonable definition of security, it is unrealistic to expect systems to be separable in practice. Moreover, not all interactions between high and low users may be seen as a breach in the system's security. After all, the main motivation behind theories of information flow is to understand which types of such interactions are admissible.
• We can slightly relax separability by requiring only that the low activity be independent of the sequence of high inputs. The new property is called generalized noninterference (GNI) [McCullough 1987 ].
• Traces are not generated at random. They usually come as a result of strategies: rules that stipulate the next input based on the history of input-output values. It has been argued that security really involves the low user not finding out anything about the high user's strategy. This notion is captured by nondeducibility on strategies (NOS) [Wittbold and Johnson 1990] .
Given all these different notions of security, it is helpful to have a single unified framework in which to express them and compare their relative strengths. One attempt to do so was suggested by McLean [1990 McLean [ , 1994 . McLean observed that most of the above security properties may be expressed as closure conditions on systems (e.g. on sets of traces): a system satisfies a given security property if for every pair of traces in the system there is a trace in the system satisfying certain properties. This intuition is formalized by associating to a security property a set F of functions from pairs of traces to traces; such a mapping from pairs of traces to traces is called a selective interleaving function (SIF) . A system Σ is said to satisfy a security property if it is closed under the associated set F of SIFs, i.e., for all σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ Σ there is some f ∈ F such that f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ.
McLean focuses on some particularly natural sets of SIFs that he calls types. To understand the notion of a type, we need to look more carefully at the structure of traces. Traces are assumed to be sequences of tuples of the form (high input, low input, high output, low output). A type consists of all SIFs that, given two traces as arguments, combine some components from the first trace with some components from the second and that satisfy certain restrictions (for example, combining the high input from the first trace and the low output from the second trace).
McLean shows that a number of security properties, including SEP and GNI, can be represented by types in the sense that there exists a type T such that a system Σ has security property S if and only if Σ is closed under type T . He thus suggests that types provide a reasonable framework in which to examine security properties. Zakinthinos and Lee [1997] point out that, in their system model (which is slightly different from that used by McLean-see Section 5), there are security properties that cannot be expressed in terms of closure under types. In this paper, we examine this question more carefully.
We show that NOS can not be represented by types. We also show that another natural property that we call double generalized noninterference (DGNI) cannot be expressed either. DGNI requires both that low activity is independent of the high inputs and that high activity is independent of the low inputs. The counterexample for DGNI actually proves the more general result that security properties expressible by types are not closed under conjunction. More precisely, there are types T 1 and T 2 such that for no type T is it the case that a system is closed under both T 1 and T 2 if and only if it is closed under T .
These negative results are proved under the assumption that the only sets of SIFs are types. If we allow more general sets of SIFs, these results no longer hold. NOS and DGNI are all expressible; moreover, in the more general setting, we have closure under conjunction. However, considering closure under arbitrary sets of SIFs is arguably not the most natural setting in which to examine security properties. Moreover, it is far from clear that even this setting is as expressive as we would like.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the formal definitions of the security properties discussed above and McLean's SIF framework. Section 3 contains the negative results of the paper. It shows that NOS and DGNI can not be represented by types. Section 4 shows that these negative results do not hold if we consider closure under sets of SIFs more general than types. In fact, under the assumption that the set of traces is countable, this framework captures all security properties. Section 5 relates our results to those of Zakinthinos and Lee [1997] . We conclude in Section 6 with some discussion of the general issue of representing security properties.
Intuitively, S picks out some systems in Σ * as the "good" systems, the ones that satisfy the property. We may not want to allow an arbitrary set of systems to be a security property. However, we have not come up yet with any reasonable restrictions on the sets of systems that count as security properties. Interestingly, Zakinthinos and Lee [1997] do put a restriction on what counts as a security property. We discuss their restriction in Section 5 and argue that it is not particularly well motivated. Note that our negative results consider specific sets of systems that correspond to security properties that have already been considered in the literature, so they should satisfy any reasonable restrictions we may want to place on the definition. Definition 2.3: Given a trace σ, we denote by σ| L the low view of σ, the sequence consisting of (low input, low output) projection. We similarly denote by σ| H the high view of σ, and by σ| HI the sequence consisting just of the high inputs.
We can now formalize the notions of security discussed in the Introduction.
Separability As mentioned before, SEP is a strong security requirement that the low and high events be independent, meaning that any low view of a trace should be compatible with any high view of a trace. Formally, a system Σ satisfies SEP if
Thus, if Σ satisfies SEP, then we can combine the low view of one trace in Σ and the high view of another trace in Σ to obtain a trace in Σ. Notice that SEP is a closure condition on the set of traces, since for every pair of traces in Σ, there is a trace in Σ with a specific property (namely, the same low view as the first trace, and the same high view as the second trace).
GNI and DGNI GNI is a weakening of SEP. A system Σ satisfies GNI if the low view of one trace is compatible with the high input view of any other trace; that is,
As SEP, GNI is a closure condition on the set of traces. Notice that, unlike SEP, GNI places no constraints on the high output sequence in σ.
A system Σ satisfies reverse GNI (RGNI) if,
Again, RGNI is a closure condition on the set of traces. A system Σ satisfies double GNI (DGNI) if it satisfies both GNI and reverse GNI. Unlike the above properties, DGNI is not a closure condition on the set of traces; it is the conjunction of two such closure conditions. Clearly SEP implies GNI and DGNI: given σ 1 and σ 2 , the trace σ guaranteed to exist by SEP satisfies all the properties required for GNI and DGNI. However, as we shall see, the converse does not hold in general.
Nondeducibility on strategies Wittbold and Johnson [1990] pointed out that in security it is often necessary to take into account the strategies being used by low and high to generate the traces. A protocol for user u determines the input that u provides to the system as a function of u's previous input and output values. A protocol for the system determines the high and low output values as a function of previous high and low inputs and outputs and the current high and low inputs.
Protocols can be nondeterministic or probabilistic. In this paper we do not consider probabilistic protocols, since the security conditions we consider are possibilistic (that is, they make no mention of probabilities). For the purposes of this discussion, assume that the low user is following a fixed protocol P L and the system is following a fixed protocol P S . Let H * be the set of all possible high protocols. If H ∈ H * , let Σ H be the set of traces generated by running (P S , P L , H). If H ⊆ H * , then define Σ H = ∪ H∈H Σ H . (Note that this is not necessarily a disjoint union.) Let S H * consist of all systems of the form Σ H for some H ⊆ H * .
With this background, we can define NOS. The system Σ H satisfies NOS if
Thus, for every trace σ ∈ Σ H and every high strategy H ∈ H, there must be a trace σ H ∈ Σ H where the high user runs H and the low user's view is the same as in σ. 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that we are in the first case, and let H be a strategy in H − H ′ . By assumption, Σ H − Σ H ′ = ∅. Since H ∈ H, it follows that Σ H ⊆ Σ H , and so Σ H − Σ H ′ = ∅; in particular, Σ H = Σ H ′ . In short, for the definition of NOS to make sense, it suffices to assume that for any strategy H and set H such that H ∈ H, there is a trace generated by H that is not generated by any protocol in H. For the rest of the paper, we make this assumption when dealing with NOS.
It is interesting to notice that NOS is not a closure condition on the set of traces, which suggests a different nature of NOS from SEP or GNI; this intuition will be formalized in Theorem 3.1.
These security properties are related. Proof: Parts (a) and (b) are almost immediate from the definitions. For part (c), suppose that system Σ H satisfies SEP, σ ∈ Σ H , and H ∈ H. Choose σ H ∈ Σ H . (There must always be at least one trace generated by running (P S , P L , H), so Σ H = ∅.) By SEP, there exists some
Since the inputs determined by H at time k + 1 depend only on the sequence of H's input and output values up to and including time k, it immediately follows that σ ′ ∈ Σ H . Thus, Σ H satisfies NOS.
The converses to (a), (b), and (c) do not hold in general, as the following examples show.
Example 2.5: Let Σ DGN I consist of the 15 traces of the form (As usual, we use the notation (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) ω to denote the trace where (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) repeats forever.) It is easy to see that this system does not satisfy SEP (for example, (0, 0, 0, 0) ω and (1, 1, 1, 1)
Example 2.6: Consider the system Σ GN I = {σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 }, where σ 1 = (1, 0, 1, 0) ω , σ 2 = (1, 1, 0, 1) ω , σ 3 = (0, 0, 0, 0) ω , and σ 4 = (0, 1, 1, 1) ω . It is easy to check that Σ GN I satisfies GNI, but it does not satisfy DGNI, since there is no trace σ ∈ Σ GN I such that σ| H = σ 4 | H and σ| LI = σ 3 | LI .
Example 2.7: Let H * consist of one protocol H; according to H, the high user first inputs 0 and then, at each step, inputs the previous low input value. Let P L 's protocol be such that, initially, the low user nondeterministically chooses either 0 or 1, and then inputs that value at every step. Finally, let the system protocol be such that the low output and high output agree with the low input. The system Σ N OS generated by this protocol consists of two traces: (0, 1, 1, 1)(1, 1, 1, 1) ω and (0, 0, 0, 0) ω . Since H * consists of only one protocol, Σ N OS trivially satisfies NOS. It is also immediate that Σ N OS does not satisfy SEP, since (0, 1, 0, 1) ω is not in Σ N OS .
One common trait of the majority of the above security properties is their correspondence to closure conditions on sets of traces (e.g. on systems): a system Σ satisfies a security property if some closure condition on Σ holds. One way to formalize this approach is to associate to each security property a set F of functions from pairs of traces to traces.
That is, a SIF takes two traces and (if defined) returns a trace.
Our notion of SIF slightly extends McLean's by allowing partial functions; this is convenient for the positive results in Section 4. Definition 2.9: A system Σ is closed under a set F of SIFs if, for all σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ Σ, there exists some f ∈ F such that (f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is defined and) f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ.
1
Of particular interest are certain sets of SIFs called types.
, if f is total and σ 3 = f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) satisfies the following constraints:
is the same as the high input of σ 1 .
• If in H = 2, then σ 3 | HI = σ 2 | HI : the high inputs of f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is the same as the high input of σ 2 .
• If in H = 0, then there are no constraints on σ 3 | HI .
There are 9 other similar clauses, depending on the value of the other components in the tuple.
Thus, for example, if f has type (1 : 2), (0 : 2) and f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = τ , then τ ∈ Σ * , τ | HI = σ 1 | HI (the high input views of τ and σ 1 are identical), τ | LI = σ 2 | LI (the low input views of τ and σ 2 are identical), there is no restriction on the high output view τ | HO of τ , and τ | LO = σ 2 | LO (the low output views of τ and σ 2 are identical).
Let
If there is a single high user and a single low user (as we have been assuming here) there are 81 possible types. (Not all these types are distinct, as we shall see.) Since a type is just a set of SIFs, it makes sense to talk about a system being closed under a type, using our earlier definition. Definition 2.11: Let S ′ be a set of systems (i.e., subsets of Σ * ) and let S be a security property. (Recall that a security property is also a set of systems.) A type T S ′ -represents a security property S with respect to S ′ if, for all systems Σ ∈ S ′ , Σ ∈ S if and only if Σ is closed under type T .
The reason that we allow the generality of representation with respect to a set S ′ of systems is that, in the case of NOS, we are interested only in systems in S H * (that is, systems of the form Σ H for some H ⊆ H * ). Let S * denote the set of all subsets of Σ * . McLean shows that SEP and GNI can both be represented by types. [Goguen and Meseguer 1982] , are represented by types.
Types are Insufficiently Expressive
Although McLean did show that a number of security properties of interest can be represented by types, given that there are only 81 types, it is perhaps not surprising that there should be some interesting security properties that are not representable by any type. In this section, we prove the two negative results discussed in the introduction: that neither NOS nor DGNI are representable by types, and that the properties representable by types are not closed under conjunction. We also show that the properties represented by types are not closed under disjunction either. Since there are only 3 4 = 81 possible types, we can prove both Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 by checking each of these types. We make a number of observations that allow us to significantly reduce the number of types that need to be checked, making it a manageable problem. We leave details to the appendix.
Theorem 3.2 is actually an instance of a more general result.
Definition 3.3: A set P of security properties is closed under conjunction if S 1 , S 2 ∈ P implies that S 1 ∩ S 2 ∈ P. Similarly, P is closed under disjunction if for all S 1 , S 2 ∈ P implies that S 1 ∪ S 2 ∈ P.
Closure under conjunction seems like a natural requirement for security properties. We may be interested in systems that satisfy both security property S 1 and security property S 2 . Closure under disjunction may also be of interest; that is, we may investigate a system that satisfies either one of properties S 1 or S 2 .
Corollary 3.4: The set of security properties representable by types is not closed under conjunction.
Proof: GNI and reverse GNI are representable by types, but the security property resulting from their conjunction (DGNI) is not representable by types.
Theorem 3.5: The set of security properties representable by types is not closed under disjunction.
Proof: See the appendix.
Representation by SIFs
The definition of closure under a set F of SIFs makes sense for arbitrary sets F , not just for types. Thus, just as for types, we can say that a set F of SIFs S ′ -represents a security property S if, for all systems Σ ∈ S ′ , Σ ∈ S if and only if Σ is closed under F . In this section we show that, if we consider arbitrary sets of SIFs rather than types, the negative results of the previous section no longer hold. More specifically, we prove that NOS is representable by SIFs and that the set of security properties representable by SIFs is closed under conjunction and disjunction. Furthermore, under certain assumptions (that are satisfied by most systems of interest), we show that every security property can be represented by SIFs. However, the representation is rather convoluted, and requires understanding what set of systems satisfy the property. This negates the whole point of using the approach to describe properties. If we already know what systems satisfy the security property, we can just work with that set directly. However, we show that a more uniform way of representing security properties can be obtain by allowing generalized SIFs that associate with each pair of traces a set of traces.
We start by showing that NOS is representable by SIFs.
Theorem 4.1: NOS is S H * -representable by SIFs.
Proof: We must find a set F of SIFs such that a system Σ ∈ S H * satisfies NOS if and only if it closed under F . Given a protocol H ∈ H * and a trace σ ∈ Σ H , let f H,σ (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be the trace σ if σ| L = σ 1 | L and σ 2 ∈ Σ H , and undefined, otherwise. (Recall that we allow partial functions.)
3 Let F be the set of all such functions. It is easy to show that if Σ H satisfies NOS, then it is closed under F . Now suppose that Σ H is closed under F . Given σ ∈ Σ H and H ∈ H, as we mentioned earlier, by our assumption that Σ H = Σ H ′ for any H ′ (in particular, for H ′ = H − {H}), there must be a trace σ H generated by H that is not generated by any other protocol in H. Since Σ H is closed under F , there is a function
The following result is also easy to see.
Proposition 4.2:
The security properties S * -representable by SIFs is closed under disjunction.
Proof: Suppose that S 1 is represented by F 1 and S 2 is represented by F 2 . Then S 1 ∪ S 2 is represented by
These results show that allowing arbitrary SIFs gives much more expressive power than just considering types. Exactly how expressive are they? As we now show, they are quite expressive: if Σ * is countable, then every security property is representable by SIFs. This already means that for many systems of interest, all security properties are expressible with SIFs. For example, if the underlying protocols being represented by Σ * all terminate, and there are only countably many of them, then Σ * will be countable. But if we allow nonterminating protocols that, for example, nondeterministically output either 0 or 1 at every step, then the set of traces will be uncountable. However, we can extend the result to uncountable sets, provided that they are not "unreasonable".
Say that a set S ′ of systems is countably generated if for all Σ ∈ S ′ , there exists a countable set Σ c of traces in Σ such that if Σ ′ ∈ S ′ and Σ ′ ⊂ Σ, then there is a trace σ ∈ Σ c − Σ ′ . Clearly if Σ * is countable, then any security property on Σ * is countably generated. (Just take Σ c = Σ.) But the notion of countable generation also applies to interesting possible uncountable systems. Given a trace σ, let σ 1:n be the prefix of σ of length n; if σ is finite and has length less than n, then σ 1:n = σ. A set Σ ⊆ Σ * of traces is limit closed [Emerson 1983 ] if for every σ ∈ Σ * and for all n ∈ N such that there exists σ ′ ∈ Σ with σ 1:n = σ ′ 1:n , it is the case that σ ∈ Σ. Intuitively, Σ is limit closed if, whenever it contains every prefix of a trace σ, it also contains σ.
Lemma 4.3: If S ′ consists only of limit-closed sets of traces, and the set of possible inputs and outputs is countable, then S
′ is countably generated.
3 If we restrict to systems Σ * and sets H * such that there is some trace σ 0 / ∈ ∪ H∈H * Σ H , then S H * is representable by total SIFs. The proof is essentially the same as that given for Theorem 4.1, but rather than taking f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) to be undefined in the proof, we take f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = σ 0 . It is then a matter of taste whether it is more reasonable to consider partial SIFs or to assume that there are traces that cannot be generated by any protocol.
Proof: Given Σ, let A consist of all the prefixes of traces in Σ. Since the set of all inputs and outputs is countable, A must be a countable set. Let Σ f be a subset of Σ such that for each prefix τ of length n in A, there exists a trace σ ∈ Σ f such that σ n = τ . Clearly we can take Σ f to be countable. Now let Σ ′ ⊂ Σ be such that Σ ′ ∈ S ′ , and let A ′ consist of all prefixes of traces in Σ ′ . If A = A ′ , then an easy argument shows that, by limit closure, we must have Σ = Σ ′ . Thus, there must be some prefix τ in A with no extension in Σ ′ . By construction of Σ f , there is some trace σ extending τ in Σ f . Clearly,
Limit closure is a natural condition that arises frequently in practice. In particular, Σ H is limit closed. Thus, S H * is countably generated, even if the set of traces in Σ H * is uncountable. In light of this, a good case can be made that we are interested in S ′ -representability only for sets S ′ that are countably generated.
Theorem 4.4: If S ′ is countably generated, then all security property are S ′ -representable by SIFs.
Proof: Suppose that Σ ∈ S
′ . We show that there exists a SIF f Σ such that Σ is the only set in S ′ that is closed under f Σ . It follows that the security property S is S ′ -representable by the set of SIFs {f Σ : Σ ∈ S}.
Since Σ is in S ′ and S ′ is countably generated, there is a countable subset Σ c of Σ with the properties from the definition. We take f Σ (σ, σ ′ ) to be undefined if at least one of σ and σ ′ is not in Σ. If both σ and σ ′ are in Σ, but only one of them is in Σ c , then we take f Σ (σ, σ ′ ) to be exactly the trace in Σ c . If none of the traces is in Σ c , then choose some trace σ c in Σ c and let it be equal to f Σ (σ, σ ′ ). There is one case left: both traces σ and σ ′ are in Σ c .
Since Σ c is countable, it is either finite or countably infinite. If it is infinite, then without loss of generality it has the form {σ k |k ∈ Z}. Then σ = σ i and σ ′ = σ j for some i and j. Let f Σ (σ i , σ j ) = σ i+1 if j even, and σ i−1 if j odd. It is easy to see that Σ is closed under f Σ . Suppose now that Σ ′ in S ′ is closed under f Σ too. Then it must be the case that Σ ′ ⊆ Σ. Suppose that Σ = Σ ′ . By definition, there is some trace in Σ c that is not in Σ ′ . Thus, there is some i such that σ i ∈ Σ ′ , but at least one of
, and since Σ ′ closed under f Σ and σ i ∈ Σ ′ , then σ i−1 must be in Σ ′ , which contradicts our supposition. If i is even, then f Σ (σ i , σ i ) = σ i+1 , so σ i+1 must be in Σ ′ , and so f Σ (σ i , σ i+1 ) = σ i−1 is also in Σ ′ , which is again a contradiction. The argument if σ i ∈ Σ ′ , but σ i+1 ∈ Σ ′ is similar, and left to the reader.
If Σ c if finite, then we can write it as {σ 1 , . . . , σ k } for some k. The proof is essentially the same, except that i + 1 or i − 1 are now modulo k.
Although Theorem 4.4 shows that essentially every security property can be represented by SIFs, the representation is not terribly interesting. The proof requires one to work backwards from an explicit representation of the security property as a set of systems to the SIF. To the extent that SIFs are going to be a useful tool for representing security properties, then there should be a more uniform way of representing security properties. For example, the representation of GNI or even NOS is essentially the same, independent of Σ * . We do not know if there is a uniform way of representing, say, DGNI using SIFs, although it follows from Theorem 4.4 that it can be represented in essentially all cases of interest.
Interestingly, by somewhat extending the notion of SIF, we can give a more uniform definition of DGNI, as well as proving closure under conjunction. The idea is to allow a SIF to associate to all pairs of traces not necessarily a single trace, but a set of traces. Proof: Suppose that S 1 is S * -representable by F 1 , and S 2 is S * -representable by F 2 , where F 1 and F 2 sets of generalized SIFs. For each f ∈ F 1 and g ∈ F 2 , define [f, g](σ 1 , σ 2 ) to be undefined if either f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) or g(σ 1 , σ 2 ) is undefined, and
It is easy to show that if Σ ∈ S 1 ∩ S 2 , then Σ is closed under F . Suppose now that Σ is closed under F . Then for all σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ Σ, there is some function [f, g] ∈ F such that [f, g](σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ. That means that f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) and g(σ 1 , σ 2 ) are both defined, and since their union is in Σ, each of then is a subset of Σ. So Σ is closed under F 1 and F 2 ; that is, Σ ∈ S 1 ∩ S 2 . Thus, we have closure under conjunction. The argument for closure under disjunction is identical to that for SIFs.
Corollary 4.7: DGNI is S
* -representable by generalized SIFs.
Related Approaches
Zakinthinos and Lee [1997] (ZL from now on) also consider the question of expressing security properties, although their approach is slightly different from McLean's. They work in an asynchronous setting. However, many of their results also hold or have obvious analogues in McLean's synchronous setting (and ours hold in the asynchronous setting). The issue of synchrony vs. asynchrony is orthogonal to the issues we are discussing here. Among other things, ZL also point out that McLean's approach is insufficiently expressive. In particular, they focus on a property they call PSP (for Perfect Security Property) which they claim is not expressible using SIFs.
4 They also introduce a general notion of security property that has some of the flavor of McLean's notion of "representable by SIFs", in that it is defined by a closure condition. As in our approach, a security property for ZL is a predicate on sets of systems. However, for ZL, it is not an arbitrary predicate; it must satisfy an additional constraint.
Definition 5.1: A predicate S on 2 Σ * is a ZL-security property (on Σ * ) if there exists a predicate Q on 2 Σ * such that, for all Σ ⊆ Σ * , S(Σ) holds iff for all σ ∈ Σ : Q(LLES(σ, Σ)) holds, where LLES(σ, Σ) = {τ |τ ∈ Σ ∧ τ | L = σ| L } is the set of traces with the same low view as σ.
That is, if a set Σ of traces is in S, then for each trace in Σ, Q must hold for the set of all traces in Σ with the same low view as σ. Conversely, if for each σ ∈ Σ, Q holds for the set of all traces in Σ with the same low view as σ, then Σ satisfies the security property.
It is not clear why this is a reasonable definition of "security property". There is certainly no independent motivation for it. The following proposition gives at least one argument against it.
Proposition 5.2: The set of ZL-security properties is not closed under disjunction.
Proof: Let Σ * consist of two traces, σ 0 and σ 1 , where the L's input and output are always 0 in σ 0 and always 1 in σ 1 . Thus, LLES(σ i , Σ * ) = {σ i }, for i = 0, 1. Clearly S 0 = {σ 0 } and S 1 = {σ 1 } are both ZL-security properties (for S 0 we take Q to hold on {σ 0 }, while for S 1 we take Q to hold on {σ 1 }.) However, S 1 ∪ S 2 is not a ZL-security property. For suppose it is; let Q be the corresponding security predicate. Then both Q({σ 0 }) and Q({σ 1 }) must hold. But then Σ * would also satisfy S 1 ∪ S 2 , which it does not.
On the other hand, Zakinthinos and Lee do show that a number of natural security properties are ZL-security properties, including SEP and GNI. A simple analysis shows that NOS is also a ZL-security property.
Proposition 5.3: NOS is a ZL-security property.
Proof: It is easy to see that the definition of NOS is equivalent to the following definition:
We now show that ZL-security properties are closed under conjunction. Since GNI is a ZL-security property, it follows that DGNI is too.
Theorem 5.4: The set of ZL-security properties is closed under conjunction.
Proof: Suppose S and S ′ are two security properties with Q and Q ′ their corresponding security predicates. Then S ∧ S ′ be the property
It follows that S ∧ S ′ is a security property with corresponding security predicate Q ∧ Q ′ .
As we said, ZL focus on a security property they call PSP. To explain PSP, we must first review the asynchronous systems considered by ZL. For them (and also, for example, for Mantel [2000] ), a system is a tuple (E, I, O, Σ) , where E is a set of events, partitioned into two sets: L and H (low events and high events), and Σ is a set of traces, each of which is a finite sequence of events in E.
5 Given a trace σ, let σ H denote the subsequence of σ consisting of the high events and let σ L denote the subsequence consisting of low events. It is quite straightforward to reformulate notions like SEP, GNI, DGNI, and NOS in this framework; we omit the details here.
The definition of PSP given by ZL is somewhat complicated. Mantel [2000] reformulates it in a more comprehensible way.
Definition 5.5: A system Σ satisfies PSP if and only if for all σ ∈ Σ, σ L ∈ Σ and for all sequences of events α, β ∈ E * and all events e ∈ E, if e ∈ H, βα ∈ Σ, (βα) L = σ L , α H = , and βe ∈ Σ, then it must be the case that βeα ∈ Σ.
ZL show that PSP is a ZL-security property. We show that it is also representable by SIFs.
Proposition 5.6: PSP is representable by SIFs.
Proof: Let F consist of the single SIF f , where f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = βeα if there exist a high event e ∈ H and sequences of events α and β such that α H = , σ 1 = βα, and σ 2 = βe; otherwise f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (σ 1 ) L . Notice that f is well defined since α, β, and e, if they exist, are uniquely determined by σ 1 and σ 2 . Notice also that f (σ 1 , σ 1 ) = (σ 1 ) L .
Suppose that Σ satisfies PSP. Let σ 1 and σ 2 be two arbitrarily chosen traces in Σ. If there exist a high event e and sequences of events α and β such that σ 1 = βα, α H = , and σ 2 = βe, then (βα) L = (σ 1 ) L , and PSP ensures that βeα ∈ Σ. Since f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = βeα in this case, f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ. On the other hand, if there do not exist such an e, α, and β, then f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (σ 1 ) L ∈ Σ since Σ satisfies PSP. So Σ is closed under F .
For the opposite implication, suppose that Σ is closed under F . Suppose that σ ∈ Σ, α, β ∈ E * , α H = , e ∈ H, βα ∈ Σ, (βα) L = σ L , and βe ∈ Σ. Since Σ is closed under F , f (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = βeα ∈ Σ. Also f (σ 1 , σ 1 ) = (σ 1 ) L , and so (σ 1 ) L ∈ Σ. But this is exactly what we needed to prove that Σ satisfies PSP.
Discussion
McLean's framework has been the impetus for a number of frameworks for expressing security properties (e.g., [Mantel 2000; Zakinthinos and Lee 1997] ), all based on defining security properties in terms of closure conditions. The question still remains as to what makes a framework "good" or better than another. Certainly one criterion is that an approach be "natural" and make it easy to express security properties. Yet another is that it be expressive, so that it can capture all natural security properties.
We have examined McLean's SIF framework with regard to expressiveness. Our results show that, as McLean presented it (considering only types), the framework is insufficiently expressive to serve as a basis for expressing security properties. The fact that the properties expressible are not closed under conjunction or disjunction, and natural properties such as NOS and DGNI are not expressible, should suffice to make that clear. On the other hand, as we have shown, natural extensions of the SIF framework are quite expressive. In the process we have shown that Zakinthinos and Lee's approach also has some problems of expressibility; the set of security properties expressible in their framework is not closed under disjunction.
The question still remains, of course, whether defining security properties in terms of closure conditions is the way to go. Mantel [2000] has perhaps the best-developed approach along these lines. He tries to provide a framework which "provides the expressiveness of Zakinthinos and Lee's framework with the elegance of McLean's". Certainly his "toolkit" approach to defining security properties seems promising. Nevertheless, it is far from clear to us that basing a framework on closure conditions is ultimately the right approach. It would be interesting to compare the expressive power and ease of use of these approaches to other approaches, such as process algebra (see, for example, [Focardi and Gorrieri 2001; Ryan and Schneider 1999; Ryan, Schneider, Goldsmith, Lowe, and Roscoe 2001] ) or a knowledge-based approach (see, for example, [?; Halpern and O'Neill 2002] ).
A Appendix: Proofs
In this appendix, we prove Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5. We restate the theorems for the readers' convenience. Theorem 3.1: NOS is not S H * -representable by a type.
Proof: We want to prove that there is no type T such that for all systems Σ, Σ ∈ H * satisfies NOS iff Σ is closed under T . As we observed, there are only 81 possible types. We proceed by a sequence of lemmas to eliminate each of these possibilities. The first of these was already proved by McLean. It is immediate from Lemma A.1 that if there is a type T that represents NOS, then we can assume without loss of generality that in H = 2.
The following lemma is straightforward, and is left to the reader. Of course, it is immediate that if S is a nontrivial security property (i.e., S = S * ) then none of the types listed in Lemma A.2 can represent S (so, in particular, none of them can represent NOS).
Consider now the system Σ N OS of Example 2.7 and recall that Σ N OS satisfies NOS.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
Based on Lemma A.1, with no loss of generality we can consider in H = 1. Since Σ N OS satisfies NOS, it means that it is closed under
L is 2, then the interleaving of σ and τ results in a trace that, after the second step, has both zeros and ones, and so it is not in Σ N OS . So in L , out H , out L are either 0 or 1; but then, by Lemma A.2, all systems are closed under T . This can't be true since NOS is not trivial.
Based on Lemma A.1, with no loss of generality we can consider in L = 1. Σ N OS satisfies NOS, so it is closed under T = T (0:1),(out H :out L ) . If at least one of out H and out L is 2, then the interleaving of σ and τ contains both 0 and 1 after the second step, and so it is not in Σ N OS . Then out H and out L are both 0 or 1; by Lemma A.2, all systems are closed under T , which contradicts the fact that NOS is not trivial.
Following the same pattern, we can prove 
that S * -represents DGNI. The following two lemmas establish a contradiction:
Proof: Recall Σ DGN I of Example 2.5 with 15 traces of the form (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) ω , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 0 or 1, with the exception of (1, 0, 1, 0) 
ω obtained from (1, 0, 1, 0) ω in the following way: if in L = 1 take x = 0, otherwise take x = 1; if out H = 1 then take y = 1, otherwise y = 0; if out L = 1 take z = 0, otherwise z = 1. Since at least one of in L , out H and out L is 2, σ ∈ Σ DGN I . But an interleaving of type T of σ and τ results into (1, 0, 1, 0) ω , which is not in Σ DGN I . This contradicts the fact that Σ DGN I is closed under T .
Proof: Consider the system Σ notGN I with 8 traces of the form (x 1 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ω , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ {0, 1}. Σ notGN I does not satisfy GNI, since an interleaving of type T (1:2),(0:2) of traces σ 1 = (0, 0, 0, 0) ω and σ 2 = (1, 1, 1, 1) ω , both in Σ notGN I , has the form (0, 1, x, 1) ω , which is not in Σ notGN I . It follows that Σ notGN I does not satisfy DGNI, too. Σ notGN I is closed under all types
Consider the system Σ GN InotDGN I consisting of 8 traces of the form (x 1 , x 2 , x 2 , x 3 ) ω , with x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ {0, 1}. Σ GN InotDGN I satisfies GNI, since an interleaving of type T (1:2),(0:2) of two traces (x 1 , x 2 , x 2 , x 3 ) ω and (y 1 , y 2 , y 2 , y 3 ) ω has the form (x 1 , y 2 , x, y 3 ) ω , and for x = y 2 this is a trace in Σ GN InotDGN I . But Σ GN InotDGN I does not satisfy reverse GNI, and for this reason DGNI too, since an interleaving of type T Finally, take Σ ′ notGN I to be the system with 8 traces of the form (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 1 ) ω , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ {0, 1}; Σ ′ notGN I does not satisfy GNI, and for this reason DGNI either, since an interleaving of type T (1:2),(0:2) of (0, 0, 0, 0) ω and (1, 1, 1, 1) ω , both in Σ Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is some type T = T (in H :in L ),(out H :out L ) that represents S ′ . Then a system is closed under T (1:2),(1:2) (the type corresponding to SEP) or T (1:2),(2:2) if and only if it is closed under T . Let Σ SEP be the system consisting of the 8 traces of the form (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 2 ) ω , with x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, in all traces of Σ SEP , the low output is the same as the low input and independent of the high view. So Σ SEP satisfies SEP.
It is easy to see that both Σ GN InotDGN I and Σ SEP are in S ′ , since Σ GN InotDGN I is closed under T (1:2),(2:2) and Σ SEP satisfies SEP. It is also easy to see that neither Σ notGN I nor Σ ′ notGN I is in S ′ . Σ SEP satisfies SEP. since neither system satisfies SEP and neither is closed under T (1:2),(2:2) . From Lemma A.1, it follows that there is a type Proof: Suppose, by of contradiction, that T = T (0:in L ),(out H :out L ) S * -represents S ′ . All systems are closed under T (0:0),(out H :out L ) for out H , out L ∈ { 1, 2 , 2, 1 } and under T (0:2),(0:out L for out L ∈ {0, 2}. Since S ′ is not trivial, we can rule out all these types. By LemmaA.1, type T = T (0:0),(1:2) is equivalent to T (0:0),(2:1) , and Σ notGN I is closed under T , although it is not in S ′ ; similarly, Σ GN InotDGN I is not closed under T , but is not in S ′ .
Lemma A.10: There is no type T = T (1:in L ),(out H :out L ) that S * -represents S ′ .
Proof: Again, suppose by way of contradiction that there is some type T = T (1:in L ),(out H :out L ) that S * -represents S ′ . If in L ∈ {0, 1}, then Σ notGN I is closed under T , but it is not in S ′ . Σ ′ notGN I is closed under T (1:2),(out H :1) , T (1:2),(2:0) and T (1:2),(0:0) , but is not in S ′ , so we can rule out these types too. T cannot be any of the types T (1:2),(1:out L ) since Σ GN InotDGN I ∈ S ′ and is not closed under them; similarly, T = T (1:2),(2:2) since Σ SEP is not closed under it, while it is in cS ′ .
We are left with the type T (1:2),(0:2) that represents GNI. Consider the system Σ with 8 traces of the form (0, x 1 , x 1 , x 2 ) ω and 8 traces of the form (1, x 1 , 1 − x 1 , x 2 ) ω , x 1 , x 2 ∈ {0, 1}. Σ satisfies GNI, since any low view is compatible with any high input sequence. Thus, Σ is closed under the type T (1:2),(0:2) . However, Σ is not separable and it is not in S, hence Σ / ∈ S ′ . Thus, T (1:2),(0:2) does not S * -represent S ′ .
